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Abstract The effect of changes in age structure on economic growth has been widely
studied in the demography and population economics literature. The beneficial effect of
changes in age structure after a decrease in fertility has become known as the “demo-
graphic dividend.” In this article, we reassess the empirical evidence on the associations
among economic growth, changes in age structure, labor force participation, and
educational attainment. Using a global panel of countries, we find that after the effect
of human capital dynamics is controlled for, no evidence exists that changes in age
structure affect labor productivity. Our results imply that improvements in educational
attainment are the key to explaining productivity and income growth and that a
substantial portion of the demographic dividend is an education dividend.
Keywords Demographic dividend . Economic growth . Education . Age structure .
Education dividend
Introduction
The introduction of the concept of the demographic dividend was an important step
forward in untying the Gordian knot of the relationship between demographic change
and economic growth. That relationship had been hotly contested for decades
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(Ehrlich 1968; Ehrlich and Ehrlich 1990; Simon 1981, 1982), and in the end, no
strong scientific consensus emerged from the debate (National Research Council
1986). These early contributions focused primarily on changes in total population
size and did not address changes in the composition of the population according to
various potentially relevant characteristics of people.
Bloom and Williamson (1998) focused on the relationship between age structure
change and economic growth and thus explicitly introduced age as a relevant source of
population heterogeneity into the analysis. Other potentially relevant sources of popula-
tion heterogeneity—which play an important role as a potential catalyst of the demo-
graphic dividend—are labor force participation and the level of educational attainment.
Although the work of Bloom and Williamson as well as several other key papers on this
issue did include education in their specifications, the now widely used and popularized
concept of the demographic dividend refers only to changes in age-dependency ratios
(based on fixed intervals of chronological age), whose evolution over the course of
demographic transition presumably results in a demographic window that first opens
and then closes in a predictable way as the old-age dependency ratio starts to increase
(UNFPA 2011). In contrast to this dominant focus on changing age distributions, recent
studies of the effect of changes in age-specific educational attainment showed that indeed
improvements in education seem to be a key driver of economic growth (see Lutz et al.
2008) and have predictive power for future income developments (see Crespo Cuaresma
and Mishra 2011). In this article, we step back to take a fresh look at the question of how
the effect of improving education relates to that of changing age structure—or, in other
words, the extent to which the demographic dividend is really an education dividend.
Improving education can affect economic growth through various channels. Higher
skill levels of the labor force can directly translate into higher productivity and into
better and faster take-up of new technologies. The direct effects of educational attain-
ment on labor productivity constitute the centerpiece of the model developed by
Mankiw et al. (1992), which generalizes the Solow model of economic growth by
adding human capital as an extra production factor. Mankiw et al. (1992) showed that
this human capital–augmented specification can explain income differences across
countries better than the standard Solow model (Solow 1956). Subsequent empirical
studies, however, were not able to systematically unveil robust positive effects of
education on economic growth at the aggregate level (see, e.g., Benhabib and Spiegel
1994; Pritchett 2001). Temple (1999) attributed such a lack of empirical support for
positive education effects to outliers in global cross-country educational attainment data
sets; the overall quality of such data has often been claimed responsible for such a
puzzling empirical regularity by Krueger and Lindahl (2001), De la Fuente and
Domenech (2006), and Cohen and Soto (2007), among others. Benhabib and Spiegel
(1994, 2005), on the other hand, emphasized the role played by education as a catalyst of
innovation and technology adoption in modelling the effects of education on income
growth. Based on the insights provided by Nelson and Phelps (1966), such a theoretical
framework implies that economic growth is affected not only by the accumulation of
human capital but also by its stock. The empirical results provided by Benhabib and
Spiegel (1994, 2005) indicated that this channel of technology adoption appears to be
extremely important in explaining income growth experiences across countries.
In addition, education is an important factor for improving the health status of the
population and also tends to contribute to the quality of governance more generally
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(Samir and Lentzner 2010; Lutz et al. 2010; Pamuk et al. 2011). Importantly, female
education is one of the key factors—if not the single most important factor—in inducing
fertility decline and hence in driving the declining young-age dependency ratio, which is
the key factor in the demographic dividend argument. A vast body of literature docu-
ments and analyzes this pervasive effect of female education on fertility, particularly for
societies still in the process of demographic transition (e.g., Bongaarts 2010; Cochrane
1979; Cochrane et al. 1990; Skirbekk and Samir 2012). Lutz and Samir (2011) illus-
trated the major effect of female education on population dynamics by showing that
when assuming identical trajectories of education-specific fertility rates, different sce-
narios of future school enrollment trends can lead to a difference ofmore than 1 billion in
the projected world population size as soon as 2050. In this sense, education could be
seen as a key trigger of the fertility decline that in consequence kick-starts the demo-
graphic dividend. The timing of this effect would be such that to produce a declining
proportion of 0- to 20-year-olds—assuming a 30-year average generation length—it is
the education of 30- to 50-year-old women that matters. These timing issues appear
important when it comes to the interpretation of modeling results.
In this article, we build on the prior literature by making an explicit distinction
between the “productivity” effect and the “translations” effect, by articulating the two
avenues through which human capital acquisition operates and measuring their separate
contributions to economic growth, and by taking changes in labor force participation
rates and changes in investment into account. For consistency, our empirical strategy
here is to use the same conditional convergence model used in most other studies of the
demographic dividend and to use the same sort of aggregated human capital variable as
in previous studies. Our results indicate that after the (robust) growth effects of educa-
tional improvements are conditioned away, the demographic dividend is reduced exclu-
sively to a quantitatively small translation effect.
The article is structured as follows. In the next section, we briefly review some of the
key contributions to the literature dealing with the demographic dividend, with a specific
view of the treatment of education in those models. We then revisit the empirics of these
associations, using improved data as compared with previous studies. In the concluding
section, we discuss the results and suggest further lines of future investigation.
Demographic Dividend Models
We can date the modern literature on the demographic dividend as beginning with
Bloom and Williamson (1998), who originally called the phase in which age structure
change resulted in more rapid economic growth the “demographic gift.” The explosion
of interest that followed was the result of five factors. First, Bloom and Williamson
showed that age structure change accounted for approximately one-third of the East
Asian economic miracle and was thus quantitatively large. Second, the econometric
approach that they used was the standard conditional convergence framework used in
many prior studies of economic growth. This approach was well understood and widely
accepted and has subsequently been used in most studies of the demographic dividend.
Third, the demographic dividend analysis provided a framework in which prior empir-
ical studies of the determinants of economic growth could be consistently integrated.
Fourth, the approach lent itself to an interesting comparison of the economic futures of
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Southeast Asian and South Asian economics. Finally, many people had strong a priori
beliefs that demography and economic growth had to be strongly connected, a belief that,
until the Bloom andWilliamson papers, did not have a convincing empirical justification.
Education and the demographic dividend were linked from the beginning. Bloom
and Williamson (1998) studied the rate of real gross domestic product (GDP) per
capita growth in 78 countries between 1965 and 1990. One of their independent
variables was the level of human capital in 1965, measured as the log of the average
years of postprimary schooling of the population 25+ years old, based on data in
Barro and Lee (1993). The results for the education variable were reported only for
their ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions and not the instrumental variable ones.
In all those regressions, the education variable always had a positive and statistically
significant coefficient. Bloom and Williamson (1998), however, did not discuss in
depth the importance of education changes to the East Asian economic miracle.
Kelley and Schmidt (2005) developed the demographic dividend model by making a
distinction between the demographic determinants of the growth of output per person of
working age (the “productivity effect”) and the growth of output per capita resulting from
changes in the share of the working-age population in the total population (the “transla-
tions effect”). They studied per capita economic growth in 86 countries over four
periods—1960–1970, 1970–1980, 1980–1990, and 1990–1995—and found that demo-
graphic changes worldwide accounted for approximately 20 % of economic growth, with
a greater effect seen in Asia and Europe. The human capital variable was the log of the
average years of postprimary schooling for males aged 25 and older and functioned as part
of the productivity effect. In all their regressions, the coefficient of the education variable
was statistically insignificant.
The productivity effect has been studied in detail in more recent contributions. Bloom
et al. (2009) showed that in a panel of countries, a reduction in fertility increases female
labor force participation and thus increases the proportion of the working-age population
who are in the labor force. Lee et al. (2000, 2003) introduced the concept of the second
demographic dividend, which occurs when an aging population accumulates more
wealth and that additional wealth is productively invested in the economy. Such effects
hinge on the different patterns of economic behavior over the life cycle and their
interaction with the institutional setting: in particular, with the existing transfer system
(see Lee et al. 2008; Mason and Lee 2006). Lee and Mason (2010) emphasized the role
that capital accumulation plays in aging economies. In particular, this contribution
concentrates on the theoretical linkages among aging, human capital accumulation,
and subsequent economic growth, thus counting as part of the second demographic
dividend some of the effects that are analyzed in our empirical model.1
Lutz et al. (2008) extended the demographic dividend model in two ways. First,
they distinguished two mechanisms for human capital to influence economic growth:
(1) through the direct effect of the productivity of workers and (2) indirectly through its
effect on the rate of total factor productivity growth. Second, they used the new IIASA-
VID education database (Lutz et al. 2007) to disaggregate education effects by both age
and level of educational attainment. These data are more consistent and more detailed
than previously existing data sources. Educational attainment distributions for four
1 See also Lee andMason (2011) for a more general account of the potential effects of the second demographic
dividend.
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educational categories have been reconstructed by five-year age groups and sex, using
methods of multidimensional population dynamics that also incorporate educational
mortality differences. Using data for 101 countries over six 5-year periods from 1970–
2000, they found that the direct productivity effect is particularly strong for older
workers with secondary education, while younger workers with tertiary education have
the greatest effect on the speed of total factor productivity growth.
Revisiting the Empirics of Age Structure, Education, and Income
The Modeling Set-Up
We adopt a modeling framework that is in the spirit of the literature on demographic
dividend effects yet differs significantly in the details. The approach used for the
statistical evaluation of the effect of demographic dynamics on economic growth is
based on simple decompositions of output per capita into output per worker and a
variable that captures changes in age structure and labor force participation.
We start our analysis by considering an aggregate production function given by
Y A K Lit it it it=
−α α1
, ð1Þ
where Yit is total output in country i at time t, Ait is total factor productivity (TFP), Kit
is the capital stock, and Lit is total labor input. Considering variables per worker, the
production function given by Eq. (1) can be written as
y A kit it it=
α
, ð2Þ
where yit = Yit / Lit is GDP per worker, and kit = Kit / Lit is capital per worker. In
growth rates, Eq. (2) can be written as
Δ = Δ + Δln ln ln .y A kit it itα ð3Þ
Because income per capita instead of income per worker is typically used for growth
regressions, the relationship between total population, working-age population, and labor
force needs to be taken into account in order to differentiate pure accounting effects from
causal links among employment, age structure, and income growth. Notice that
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where denotes GDP per capita, and Nit refers to total population. Combining
Eqs. (3) and (4) to obtain an expression for income per capita,
Δ = Δ + Δ − Δ = Δ + Δ + Δln ln ln ln ln ln lny y L N A kit it it it it itα L Nit it− Δ ln . ð5Þ
Assuming that TFP growth is constant over time, the empirical implementation of
Eq. (5) implies regressing the growth rate of income per capita on the growth rate of capital
per worker, the growth rate of the labor force, and the growth rate of population. The
parameters associated with the last two variables should equal 1 and −1, respectively, if
changes in the labor force share do not have productivity effects and affect only income
per capita through the accounting channel exposed in Eq. (4).
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If we assume that, because of technology adoption and income convergence dynam-
ics, the growth rate of TFP depends on the distance to the global technology frontier as
proxied by the level of labor productivity, this specification can be rewritten as a (linear)
function of the level of income per worker:
Δ = + + Δ + Δ − Δ
−
ln ln ln ln ln .y y k L Nit it it it itδ μ α1 ð6Þ
This specification implies thus that the growth rate of TFP can be decomposed into
a secular trend, captured by the parameter , and (assuming a negative μ parameter)
conditional convergence dynamics, which make TFP growth linearly dependent on
the (lagged) income per worker of the country. Using the fact that
ln ln ln ln lny y
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ln ln ,
where Wit denotes working-age population,
= +ln ln ln lny y
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it it
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1
1W
k L N
it
it it it+ +ln ln ln . ð7Þ
This specification implies that the working-age share and the participation rate
should be added to the economic growth specification in addition to the growth rate
of the labor force and total population. Parameter estimates of the same size and
opposite sign of that of the initial income level for these two variables imply that
changes in the participation rate and the working-age share affect economic growth
exclusively through the accounting channel described earlier.
The production function given byEq. (1) does not consider human capital as either an input
of production or a determinant of TFP growth. We can easily generalize the production
function to include human capital (see, e.g., Benhabib andSpiegel 1994;Hall and Jones 1999):
Y A K Hit it it it=
−α α1
,
where Hit = hitLit, and human capital perworker is denoted by hit, which in turn is defined as
h sit it= exp ,θ
where refers to the returns to schooling, and sit are the average years of schooling of the
labor force. The corresponding specification for the model with human capital is given by
Δ = Δ + Δ + Δ − Δ + −( ) Δln ln ln ln lny A k L N sit it it it it itθαα .1 ð8Þ
Assuming the dependence of technology growth on the distance to the technology
frontier, the specification is then given by
= +ln ln ln lny y
W
N
L
Wit it
it
it
it1
1
1
it
it it itk L N+ +
1
ln ln ln
its+ ( )1 .
ð9Þ
In addition, the overall human capital stock (average years of schooling) is often assumed to
affect the growth rate of TFP by acting as a catalyst of technology creation and technology
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adoption (see, e.g., Benhabib and Spiegel 1994, 2005). This view of the role of human capital
leads to an econometric specification where, in addition to the change in average years of
schooling, the level of education also enters the model as a determinant of TFP growth; thus,
= + +ln ln ln lns y
W
Nit it it
it
it
1
1
1
L
W
it
it
1
1
.
Such a TFP growth specification can be included in Eq. (8) to obtain the more general
econometric specification, which is given by
= + +ln ln ln ly s y
W
Nit it it
it
it
1
1
1
n ln
L
W
kit
it
it+
1
1
ln lnL Nit it+ + ( )1 sit .
ð10Þ
The Empirical Evidence
We confront the preceding different specifications with a panel data for 105 countries over
the period 1980–2005, divided into five-year periods. The selection of countries was
exclusively determined by the availability of the required data. The source of our data and
the list of countries included in the analysis are presented in the appendix. All the
specifications estimated include country and period fixed effects. The inclusion of the lagged
income per capita term on the right side of some of the models presented implies that the
estimation of panel data models with country fixed effects, so as to obtain inference from
within-country dynamics, is not straightforward. Standard OLS estimation methods would
lead to biased estimates given that we do not take into account the correlation between the
error term (which includes a country-specific fixed effect) and the lagged dependent
variable. Generalized method of moments (GMM) methods have been proposed by
Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1999) to
overcome the endogeneity problem by using lagged values of first differences and levels of
the explained variable as instruments. In our empirical implementation, we use the Blundell-
Bond “system” GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond 1999) for models that include lagged
income per capita as an explanatory variable. The Blundell-Bondmethod has been shown to
perform best for highly persistent variables, as is the case of income per capita.
The estimation of the different specifications is presented in Table 1. For the models
estimated by GMM (those which include the initial income per capita level as a
regressor), we include the usual specification tests related to instrumentation (Sargan
test for overidentifying restrictions) and to the characteristics of the residuals (the
standard tests for first- and second-order residual autocorrelation). We account for the
potential endogeneity of the growth rate in the labor force and the change in years of
schooling, which are measured over the same five-year period as the dependent variable
and may be thus correlated with shocks to economic growth.2 We instrument these
2 At longer horizons than those considered in our model, the endogeneity problems could be more complex,
since shocks to income could also be correlated with the age structure variables. Because we use five-year
periods as a time unit, there are no reasons to expect that contemporaneous shocks to economic growth
affect the age-structure variables given the ample lag between fertility dynamics and the change in the share
of working-age population to total population.
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covariates using two lags of the variables and their first difference, as is done for the
lagged income level in the framework of the Blundell and Bond (1999) method. As
theoretically expected, the growth rate of the labor force is significantly and positively
related to economic growth, with estimates that range between 0.8 and 2. The growth
rate of population, on the other hand, does not enter the model significantly in any of the
specifications, although its effect is on average positive. The fourth specification
presented in Table 1, which includes the growth rates of the labor force and total
Table 1 Panel regression estimates for the income growth model, 1980–2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Δlnkit 0.419* 0.582** 0.589** 0.564** 0.559** 0.492**
[0.160] [0.165] [0.126] [0.133] [0.102] [0.111]
ΔlnLit –– 0.797* 1.479* 1.961** 1.609** 1
[0.376] [0.658] [0.485] [0.510] (imposed)
ΔlnNit –– 0.89 0.37 0.187 0.348 −1
[0.997] [1.052] [1.081] [0.979] (imposed)
lneyit−1 –– –– −0.043 −0.064 −0.110* −0.178*
[0.0479] [0.0437] [0.0479] [0.085]
ln(Lit / Wit) –– –– 0.302 0.557* 0.519
† 0.178*
[0.326] [0.271] [0.288] [0.085]
ln(Wit / Nit) –– –– 0.871 1.391* 0.995 0.178*
[0.790] [0.623] [0.619] [0.085]
Δsit –– –– –– 0.131 0.400* 0.717*
[0.170] [0.177] [0.306]
sit – 1 –– –– –– –– 0.0405** 0.0671*
[0.0128] [0.0335]
Test for Accounting Effect:
Growth Rates (p value)
–– .1538 .3767 .0503 .1350 ––
Test for accounting effect:
Levels (p value)
–– –– .5035 .0201 .1941 ––
Test for Accounting Effect:
Growth Rates and Levels (p
value)
–– –– .7144 .0505 .3918 ––
Sargan Test (p value) –– –– .1323 .2457 .5433 .2665
AR(1) Test (p value) –– –– .0032 .0017 .0026 .0522
AR(2) Test (p value) –– –– .1768 .2548 .2918 .1741
Observations 521 521 521 521 521 521
Number of Countries 105 105 105 105 105 105
Notes: Robust standard errors are in brackets. The dependent variable is the growth rate of GDP per capita
over the corresponding five-year period. The panel data set spans information for 105 countries over the
period 1980–2005, divided into five-year periods. Tests for accounting effects refer to the tests of the
restrictions described in the text. Sargan Test is the p value of the Sargan test for overidentifying
restrictions. AR(p) Test is the p value of the test for pth order autocorrelation of the residuals. All
specifications include country and period fixed effects. Variables that are in growth rates or changes are
measured over the corresponding period. All other variables are measured in the first year of the period.
†p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01
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population together with the participation rate and the working-age share, as well as the
change in years of schooling, shows demographic dividend effects which are above the
pure translation effects defined by Eq. (4). The estimation results of this model would
lead us to conclude that the participation and age structure effects that follow fertility
declines have direct productivity and economic growth-enhancing effects. Furthermore,
the effect of education would be deemed to be statistically insignificant, and human
capital investments would not appear to have a clear return in terms of income growth.
In the fifth column of Table 1, we consider education to affect economic growth
not only as an input of the production function through the augmentation of labor
income but also as a determinant of total factor productivity, as in Nelson and Phelps
(1966). The variable measuring average years of schooling has a significant positive
effect on economic growth, and its inclusion as an extra regressor renders the
parameter attached to the change in educational attainment also positive and signif-
icant. Furthermore, the returns to education implied by the parameter estimate
associated with Δsit are approximately 18 %, well above those usually found in the
microeconometric literature. Theoretically, this is precisely what would be expected
from returns to education at the macroeconomic level, where externalities are likely to
be quantitatively much larger than at the individual level.
Most importantly, the pure demographic effects (excluding education) implied by
the parameters attached to the labor participation and working-age share variables are
now not significantly different from the pure translation effects because, theoretically,
the models are built on output per worker but, empirically, income per capita is used.
Column 6 in Table 1 estimates the restricted model, imposing the parameter restric-
tions implied by the existence of translation effects. Such a regression implies that the
estimated effects of the human and physical capital variables are to be interpreted as
direct effects on income per worker. The size of the effect of human capital improve-
ments in this specification appears accordingly much larger than in the rest of the
regressions.
The relative role of age structure and labor force participation versus human capital
dynamics, assuming that the translation effect is in place, can be evaluated by
assessing the quantitative effect of typical variations in the corresponding variables.
Obtaining the within-country standard deviation of the ratio of the labor force to total
population and its growth rate, as well as of mean years of schooling and its change,
we can calculate the size of the effect of typical in-sample variations of our variables
of interest on income growth. In Table 2, we present the resulting effects of a change
by 1 (within-country) standard deviation of these variables on yearly income per
capita growth implied by Model 6 in Table 1, as well as the effect corresponding to
typical changes in the physical capital accumulation variable. In addition to present-
ing the composite demographic dividend effect from changes in the share of the labor
force over total population, we also present the effects of a 1 standard deviation
change in the share of labor force over working-age population (keeping the share of
working-age population over total population constant), as well as the pure age
structure effect emanating from changes in the share of working-age population to
total population (keeping labor participation constant).
The results are presented evaluating the variation of the age-structure/participation,
physical, and human capital variables in the full sample as well as in subsamples
defined by income groups according to the World Bank. Compared with the human
Is the Demographic Dividend an Education Dividend? 307
Table 2 Size of effects on economic growth
Within-Country
SD
Effect on Yearly
Income Growth
Full Sample (ΔlnLit – ΔlnNit) 2.93 % 0.59 %
(ΔlnLit – ΔlnWit) 2.00 % 0.40 %
(ΔlnWit – ΔlnNit) 1.95 % 0.39 %
ln(Lit / Nit) 4.98 % 0.18 %
ln(Lit / Wit) 2.79 % 0.10 %
ln(Wit / Nit) 3.30 % 0.12 %
Δsit 0.081 1.17 %
sit 0.689 0.92 %
Δlnkit 13.73 % 1.35 %
High-Income Countries: OECD (N = 23) (ΔlnLit – ΔlnNit) 2.86 % 0.57 %
(ΔlnLit – ΔlnWit) 2.82 % 0.56 %
(ΔlnWit – ΔlnNit) 1.40 % 0.28 %
ln(Lit / Nit) 4.31 % 0.15 %
ln(Lit / Wit) 3.39 % 0.12 %
ln(Wit / Nit) 2.19 % 0.08 %
Δsit 0.065 0.93 %
sit 0.560 0.75 %
Δlnkit 4.50 % 0.44 %
High-Income Countries: Non-OECD (N = 3) (ΔlnLit – ΔlnNit) 6.56 % 1.31 %
(ΔlnLit – ΔlnWit) 1.56 % 0.31 %
(ΔlnWit – ΔlnNit) 5.41 % 1.08 %
ln(Lit / Nit) 6.85 % 0.24 %
ln(Lit / Wit) 2.58 % 0.09 %
ln(Wit / Nit) 4.81 % 0.17 %
Δsit 0.131 1.88 %
sit 0.855 1.15 %
Δlnkit 12.04 % 1.18 %
Low-Income Countries (N = 30) (ΔlnLit – ΔlnNit) 2.10 % 0.42 %
(ΔlnLit – ΔlnWit) 1.12 % 0.22 %
(ΔlnWit – ΔlnNit) 1.88 % 0.38 %
ln(Lit / Nit) 2.78 % 0.10 %
ln(Lit / Wit) 1.51 % 0.05 %
ln(Wit / Nit) 2.36 % 0.08 %
Δsit 0.091 1.31 %
sit 0.685 0.92 %
Δlnkit 13.08 % 1.29 %
Lower Middle-Income Countries (N = 32) (ΔlnLit – ΔlnNit) 3.33 % 0.67 %
(ΔlnLit – ΔlnWit) 2.07 % 0.41 %
(ΔlnWit – ΔlnNit) 2.07 % 0.41 %
ln(Lit / Nit) 5.05 % 0.18 %
ln(Lit / Wit) 2.18 % 0.08 %
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capital effects, the size of the translation effects is relatively small in the full sample,
even if the role of labor participation changes is included in this quantification. The
pure age structure effect, summarized in the estimated income growth response to
changes in the share of working-age population, is in turn significantly smaller after
labor participation changes are deducted (roughly two-thirds of the combined age and
participation effect). The relative size of the realized human capital effects in low-
income countries, which present only limited growth effects due to the accounting
channel, is particularly large. The group of lower–middle income countries appears to
have benefitted from both relatively large translation effects and even larger human
capital effects on economic growth in comparison to the rest of the sample, with the
exception of the small and heterogeneous group of non-OECD high-income countries
(formed by Equatorial Guinea, the Bahamas, and Singapore). Capital accumulation
(both in the form of physical and human capital) exert the most sizable effects in
income growth in all groups of countries. As economic theory predicts, the economic
growth effects of physical capital accumulation (capital deepening) appear particu-
larly relevant for developing economies and emerging economies.
Summarizing the set of results presented earlier, we can conclude that not properly
accounting for the role of education as a determinant of economic growth would have
led us to believe that the beneficial income growth effects took place directly through
changes in age structure. After we control for both the stock and improvement in human
capital, we find that statistically, the change in educational attainment levels is the primal
source of the demographic dividend effects present in the data. Empirically, the pure
effect of changes in age structure on economic growth appears to take place exclusively
through translation effects related to the measurement of income as GDP per capita
instead of GDP per worker. Given that our preferred specifications control for both
educational attainment and labor force dynamics, the estimated effects of human capital
go beyond the role that the variable plays as a determinant of labor force participation. It
Table 2 (continued)
Within-Country
SD
Effect on Yearly
Income Growth
ln(Wit / Nit) 3.93 % 0.14 %
Δsit 0.088 1.26 %
sit 0.766 1.03 %
Δlnkit 12.30 % 1.21 %
Upper Middle-Income Countries (N = 17) (ΔlnLit – ΔlnNit) 2.51 % 0.50 %
(ΔlnLit – ΔlnWit) 1.83 % 0.37 %
(ΔlnWit – ΔlnNit) 1.36 % 0.27 %
ln(Lit / Nit) 7.69 % 0.27 %
ln(Lit / Wit) 4.31 % 0.15 %
ln(Wit / Nit) 4.26 % 0.15 %
Δsit 0.058 0.84 %
sit 0.687 0.92 %
Δlnkit 10.61 % 1.04 %
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is the increased productivity and technology innovation or adoption capabilities of
more-educated individuals in the labor force that appear particularly relevant as an
explanatory factor of growth differences in GDP per worker within countries for our
sample.
Although the models estimated and presented here were developed to roughly
resemble the earlier landmark studies on the demographic dividend, a few noteworthy
differences should be kept in mind when comparing the results:
& Our model considers convergence in terms of output per worker, not output per
person of working age, as is the case in most of the other studies. Because we had
access to new data on labor force participation, this seemed the more appropriate
specification in the spirit of the underlying economic growth model.
& As a consequence of the availability of these labor force data, we explicitly
included the labor force participation rate as a variable in the model. To our
knowledge, this has not been done by earlier studies. This also has implications
for what is defined to be the translation effect and productivity effect. If the model
is specified only in terms of persons of working ages, an underlying increase in,
for example, female labor force participation shows up as an increase in produc-
tivity of persons in working age. In our model, this effect can be directly
measured and is interpreted as part of the translation effect.
& Unlike earlier empirical studies on the demographic dividend, we explicitly include
data on investment in our models. In the framework of the estimation of aggregate
production functions, statistical tests for the existence of translation effects—such as
those performed in the demographic dividend literature—would be based on
misspecified models if the physical capital component is not included.3 Although
potential effects of changes in the age structure on physical capital accumulation
cannot be ruled out (following the rationale described in, for example, Lee and
Mason 2010, 2011), our results indicate that these alone are not sufficient to explain
the size of the effects that had been hitherto attributed to the demographic dividend.
& Many of the earlier studies also included life expectancy at birth as an explanatory
variable in the equations. We also did this initially, but because its effect consis-
tently turned out to be insignificant, we decided to not include it in the table of
results presented here.
& Unlike many of the earlier studies that did include indicators of the level of
education in the form of mean years of schooling of the adult population, we
include both the level of the education variable and its change over time. As the
results presented earlier show, this makes an important difference with respect to
the importance of the education variable to economic growth. As described
earlier, our analysis also uses a new and more internally consistent set of educa-
tion data as provided by the IIASA-VID reconstructions.
3 Given the focus of our analysis on human capital, the linkage between age-structure changes and physical
capital accumulation is not explored in further detail. The second dividend literature (see, e.g., Lee and
Mason 2010) emphasizes how age-structure dynamics affect physical capital accumulation through behav-
ioral differences across the life cycle. Although the potential existence of such effects deserves further
scrutiny in the context of the econometric specifications put forward in this analysis, a more systematic
quantitative assessment goes beyond the scope of this study.
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Keeping these differences in the estimated models and used data in mind, the signif-
icantly different findings that we obtain appear to result primarily from three factors:
1. The educational attainment data used here are more consistent across countries
and over time than the Barro and Lee (2001) data. These differences are
discussed in detail in Lutz et al. (2007), Lutz et al. (2008), and Lutz and Samir
(2011). The higher consistency is essentially a consequence of the demographic
back-projections (including consideration of educational mortality differences),
where by definition, the education categories stay consistent, unlike in the official
data reported by countries to UNESCO where categories tend to be unstable
(Lutz et al. 2007).
2. The estimation method used in this study is state of the art. Using dynamic panel
GMM methods, we are able to avoid biases in the estimation that originate from
the panel structure of the data set.4
3. A key difference seems to lie in the way the education variable is treated. By
including only the level or the change in educational attainment, previous studies
evidently lost relevant information, which we include by adding both to the
model in the spirit of the endogenous growth literature.
Conclusions and Paths of Further Research
Using an improved data set and state-of-the-art panel methods, we show that the labor
productivity effects, which are claimed to accompany the demographic dividend, can
be explained through the changes in educational attainment level that take place hand
in hand with fertility declines. The remaining effect of changes in the age structure on
economic growth does not appear statistically different from the standard translation
effect because of the changes in dependency ratios during the demographic transition.
The size of the translation effect related to age structure changes is found to be very
small. Our results imply that the successful historical examples of demographic
dividend effects need to be understood in the context of the educational expansion
that accompanied the observed changes in age structure. In this respect, they confirm
the results of Collins and Bosworth (1996) and Rodrik (1998), among others, which
identify human capital accumulation as one of the key factors explaining the
sustained income growth rates in East Asia between the 1960s and 1990s.
This article should be seen as only a first step in a broader assessment of the effects of
changes in population composition according to a larger number of relevant individual
characteristics on economic growth. Here, we limited our focus to (chronological) age,
labor force participation, and educational attainment. Themodels were defined in a way to
be roughly compatible with the most influential previous models in the demographic
dividend literature. Our statistical analysis shows that the explicit consideration of both the
levels and the changes in educational attainment adds significant explanatory power and
deserves to be a key component of any future study on the demographic dividend.
Because empirically a declining young-age dependency ratio tends to come along with
4 This point does not seem to make a decisive difference. Our results are broadly consistent with those in
Lutz et al. (2008), where standard OLS models with fixed effects are used.
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the increasing educational attainment of the adult population, simple models that consider
only fixed age intervals and disregard education can thus falsely attribute the productivity
enhancing effect of education to a declining young-age dependency ratio and thus the
typically preceding fertility decline. Our results show precisely the role of human capital
in offering the explanation for the effects that the first demographic dividend literature
tends to systematically find. In spite of the fact that second demographic dividend effects
related to higher human capital accumulation (such as those in Lee andMason (2010)) are
supported by our results, the mechanisms highlighted in our model setting are not
explicitly related to aging societies, as is the case with this strand of the literature.
A further extension of the analysis should use the age, sex, and distribution detail of
the newly reconstructed human capital data. Because in most countries the younger
cohorts are better educated than the older ones, the use of mean years of schooling of the
entire adult population above a certain age (as is done in most economic studies) cannot
reflect these intercohort differences. Another potential topic of study is the degree to
which differential expansion rates of the different educational attainment categories
affect economic growth and how this interacts with the changing age structure.
Finally, human capital is based not only on formal education and labor force partici-
pation but also on skills, cognitive functioning, and health. Although these dimensions are
clearly more difficult to quantify, and hardly any time series with consistent data exist,
more could be done using existing data for subsets of countries, such as the OECD or EU,
for which more standardized surveys exist (Hanushek andWoessmann 2008). An explicit
inclusion of age-specific health and cognition indicators could also help to address the
problems of using longer time series based on conventional chronological age.
The answer to the question posed in the title of this paper is “yes,” what previous
studies have identified as an age structure dividend really is dominantly an education
dividend.
Acknowledgement Wewould like to thank the participants in the NewDirections in the Economic Analysis
of Education Conference at the University of Chicago and at the 2013 annual meeting of the Population
Association of America for helpful comments. Funding for this work was made possible by the European
Research Council (ERC)Advanced Investigator Grant focusing on “Forecasting Societies’Adaptive Capacities
to Climate Change” (ERC-2008-AdG 230195-FutureSoc).
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and
the source are credited.
Appendix: Data and Variables
Table 3 presents the list of countries included in the analysis. All countries for which
data are available are used, with the exception of oil exporters. Income per capita data
are sourced from the Penn World Tables (PWT) 6.3 (Heston et al. 2009). Capital
stock data are obtained using the perpetual inventory method based on investment
rates from the PWT 6.3. Labor force, working-age population, and total population
are obtained from the World Bank World Development Indicators. The educational
attainment variable is the mean years of schooling for persons aged 15–64, sourced
from the IIASA-VID data set.
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